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Executive Summary 
 
 
The communists’ electoral victory and the elevation of Voronin to the Presidency 
drew Moldova closer to the Russian Federation and raised new questions about 
the stability of the Dniester Moldovan Republic.  
 
The existence of the DMR no longer serves Russian interests as it did in the past. 
 
The prospects for confrontation between the DMR and Moldova are greater 
today as a result of the Communist Party victory.  
 
President Voronin is willing to accept the existence of the DMR.  
 
By the latter part of the past decade, the DMR existed primarily as a vehicle for 
criminal activities rather than as a bastion of Stalinism and Russian nationalism.  
 
Weapons left behind by Soviet forces have made the DMR a major factor in 
illegal arms trafficking.  
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The Presence of Russian Federation Troops in Eastern Moldova 
 
The Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence on the August 27, 1991 
following the disintegratio n of the USSR. At that time, there were about 30,000 
Soviet soldiers in 36 military garrisons on the territory of the Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic. Most of the units belonged to the 14th Army. These troops 
found themselves in a legal void. Meanwhile,  separatist insurgencies in 
Transdniestria and Gagauzia and the massive arrival in Moldova of Russian 
mercenaries (most notably, Don Cossacks) made the creation of the Republic of 
Moldova National Army and the clarification of the legal status of former Soviet 
military units an urgent matter.1  
 
On November 14, 1991, the equipment of the former Soviet military units in the 
Republic of Moldova was declared property of the state (Decree No. 234 of the 
President of the Republic of Moldova). On March 18, 1992, the President of the 
Republic of Moldova issued a decree assuming jurisdiction over military 
formations located in Moldova. These measures served as a legal basis for the 
creation of the National Army, but provoked a negative reaction in Moscow. As a 
result, on March 20, 1992 the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the 
General Staff of the United Army Forces of the CIS signed an agreement 
regarding the status of military forces of the former USSR located in Moldova. 
According to this treaty, about 150 military units in Moldova were to pass under 
the authority of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Moldova. Another 50 
units, considered strategic by the Russians, would remain under CIS control. The 
units of the CIS were scheduled to withdraw from the territory of the Republic of 
Moldova by January 1, 1993. 
 
The situation in the localities in eastern Moldova became very serious, however. 
The units of the 14th Army were in an extremely tense atmosphere. Separatists 
were already destroying the state structures of the Republic of Moldova. Stores 
of weapons and ammunition were assaulted by crowds searching for weapons 
for separatist forces. As a consequence, it was common for officers of the 14th 
Army to formally pass to the reserves, then immediately receive jobs at the 
plants from the Industrial Military Complex of the former USSR. At the same 
time they became members of the Labor Detachments of Collaboration with the 
militia, the Territorial Emergency Detachments and the Dniestrean National 
Guard. The amorphous structures of the CIS could not control the situation. 
Consequently, on April 1, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree regarding 
Russian military units which, in effect, invalidated the CIS-Moldova Agreement.  
                                                        
1 Gagauzia is in southern Moldova. The Gagauz people are Christians of Turkish extraction. They make up 
about 3.5% of the population of Moldova (including Transdniestria).  
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Open intervention of the 14th Army on the side of the separatists began 
immediately after the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence. In 
September 1991, the commander of the 14th Army, General Iakovlev, accepted 
an appointment as President of the Supreme Council of Defense of the Dniester 
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. An open transfer of armament to the 
paramilitary formations of separatists and mercenaries took place. In Spring 
1992, separatist troops also obtained heavy armament such as tanks and artillery 
(including Grad multiple rocket launchers) from the 14th Army. There were 
cases when entire units passed under the authority of the DMR. The 14th Army 
openly intervened in the conflict on the side of the separatist regime in spring–
summer 1992, ensuring its salvation.  
 
By the end of 2000, there were no Russian troops west of the Dniester and 14th 
Army had been reduced to about 2,800 soldiers (mostly native to the region) and 
renamed the Operative Group of Troops. The unit consisted of the 8th Motorized 
Infantry Brigade with an attached tank battalion and transport helicopter 
squadron. Its armament includes 119 tanks, 129 armored fighting vehicles, 129 
artillery pieces, 36 anti-tank launchers and 7 helicopters.  
 
Ammunition stores are another problem. Most Russian materiel in Moldova is 
kept at the village of Colbasna. The ammunition stocks in Colbasna were created 
for the needs of the 14th Army. However, when the evacuation of the Soviet 
troops from the eastern European states began, Colbasna’s ammunition holdings 
expanded considerably. In 1991, the stores’ commandant reported 45,951 tons of 
ammunition on hand. However, in 1994, within the framework of the 
negotiations regarding military equipment on the territory of the Republic of 
Moldova, the Russian military reported only 24,266 tons. This discrepancy has 
raised suspicions that ammunition has passed to the paramilitary formations of 
the DMR. On October 21, 1994, the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Moldova signed an agreement that stipulated that Russian troops should be 
evacuated in three years.2 Alerted by that agreement, the separatist leader Igor 
Smirnov issued a decree that banned the evacuation of the ammunition from the 
territory of the DMR and declared it the property of the “Transdniestria people.” 
In 1994, the stores at Colbasna were divided into two parts, one of which is 
controlled and guarded by the DMR (the 3rd Motorized Infantry Battalion from 
Rybnitsa).3 Since there is a frontier post at the stores’ exit, manned by troops 
from the State Security Ministry of the DMR, the separatist regime controls the 
removal of armament from both sections of the stores. 
 
                                                        
2 The Russian Duma has not ratified this treaty. In November of 1995, the Duma passed a resolution 
declaring Transdniestr a zone of strategic Russian interests.  
3 This battalion has about 350 soldiers and is equipped with armored personnel carriers, a battery of multiple 
rocket launchers, a battery of six MT-12 anti-tank guns, and an anti-aircraft battery of ZU-23-2s. 
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The acceptance in 1996 of the Russian Federation into the Council of Europe was 
conditioned on the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Moldova. On 
the eve of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
summit in Istanbul in November 1999, the Russian Federation evacuated three 
trains loaded with auxiliary equipment as a symbolic gesture, but the Russian 
Federation still maintains a military presence in Transdniestria. The Russian 
Federation blames separatist leaders for their failure to complete the evacuation. 
On June 17, 2000, a Russian representative in Vienna presented the schedule of 
evacuation for the ammunition, but claimed that the schedule could be followed 
only with the cooperation of the separatist leaders.  
 
At present, the situation regarding the evacuation of troops and ammunition 
remains unclear. On the eve of the meeting of the OSCE Ministers of External 
Affairs from Vienna on November 27, 2000, Russia made another symbolic 
gesture, removing 50 wagons of auxiliary equipment. On November 23, the 
DMR’s president, minister of state security, and minister of external affairs were 
invited to Moscow by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation to discuss the evacuation schedule. When they came back to Tiraspol, 
the separatist leaders presented this step as part of “the Agreement Protocol on 
Military and Property Issues,” signed by Russian Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin and the Transdniestrian separatist leader, Igor Smirnov on March 
20, 1998 at Odessa. This protocol, signed with the tacit agreement of the Republic 
of Moldova, stipulates the separation of the materiel into three categories:  
 
- Materiel of the Operative Group of Troops; 
- Materiel that must be unconditionally evacuated to the territory of the 
Russian Federation;  
- Materiel that can be sold (The proceeds to be divided in proportion of 50% 
to 50% between the Russian Federation and the DMR). 
 
The destiny of the Russian military presence in Transdniestria will depend 
largely on the evolution of the political situation within the Republic of Moldova. 
The Russian Federation actively influenced the political situation in the Republic 
when Petru Lucinschi was President by enlisting the support of the Moldovan 
Communist Party, the Russian language press and Russian secret services. The 
desired goal was to bring to governance, through the democratic process, pro-
Moscow political forces. Such a development would, they believed, facilitate a 
Moldovan merger with the Russia-Belarus Union, Russian military bases in 
Moldova and the establishment of Russian as the official second language of the 
state. This, in turn, could encourage pro-Russian sentiment s in the Ukraine. The 
communist victory in the 2001 elections indicated that this strategy as a sound 
one. 
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Historical Background  
 
On March 27, 1918, after the disintegration of the Russian Empire, most of what 
is now the Republic of Moldova became part of Romania. The slice of Moldova 
east of the Dniester remained part of Russia. In 1924, it became the Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). In 1940, the USSR annexed the 
rest of Moldova. In August 1994, combining the recently annexed territory with 
the MASSR, Soviet authorities created the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MSSR). The Soviets created an anti-Romanian phobia to avoid questions from 
the local population about the legality of annexation of 1940 and formation of the 
MSSR. In schools, the period between 1918 and 1940 (when western Moldova 
was part of Romania) was presented as “the period of Romanian-Fascist 
occupation.” From the very first days after the annexation, the Soviet regime 
attacked entire social groups. Teachers, priests, former officials and farmers 
(especially those who opposed forced collectivization) were all assaulted. 
Repeated forced deportations to Kazakhstan and Siberia took place from 1941 to 
1949. Forced collectivization and a terrible drought in 1947 resulted in a famine 
in which at least 200,000 people died of malnutrition. Though there was no food, 
the Communist regime prohibited the free movement of the local population to 
other areas from the USSR. The official historiography addressed the famine only 
after the collapse of the USSR.  
 
Meanwhile, attacks were directed against the population’s historical memory 
and culture. Churches were destroyed. Subscription to the Romanian press was 
prohibited (only in the MSSR, not in the other Soviet republics) as was the sale of 
literature published in Romania. With the replacement of the Latin alphabet with 
Cyrillic, the Romanian spoken by the local population was now called 
“Moldovan.” The fiction that Moldovan was a language rather than a dialect was 
pushed to the extent that Moldovan KGB officers received a bonus of 15% of 
their salary for foreign language (Romanian) aptitude. Simultaneously, the idea 
that the Moldovan nation had no connection to Romania was insistently 
imposed.  
 
From 1940, the Soviets changed the ethnic composition of the population of 
Moldova. Despite the fact that the population density of the MSSR was the 
highest in the USSR (127 persons/square km), there was an influx of Russians. 
These new arrivals did not know the language of the local population  or the 
history of this territory and the majority of them were citizens of the USSR. 
Meanwhile, Moldovans were sent to other Soviet republics under various 
programs (mobilization to forced work, etc.).  
 
The ethnic composition of Transdniestria is more russified than that of western 
Moldova. Many of the Russian immigrants had been factory workers who had 
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been sent to work in the more industrialized Transdniestria region. In addition, 
retired soldiers, most of whom were Russians, often settled in Tiraspol and 
Bender.4 In western Moldova, 69.5% of the population is Moldovan or Romanian 
and 20.5% is Russian or Ukrainian. In Transdniestria, 58% is Russian or 
Ukrainian (In Tiraspol more than 80% of the population is of Slav origin.) and 
40% are Moldovan or Romanian. In Transdniestria, the concentration of Soviet 
troops was much higher than in western Moldova.  
The conflict started with disputes over national languages. In 1989, in the MSSR, 
the “Moldovan” language was declared as the state language (recognizing, 
however, that it is essentially the same as Romanian), though the Latin alphabet 
was re-imposed. Transdniestrian separatists insisted on keeping the Cyrillic 
alphabet. By and large, the Moldovan government did not press the issue, but in 
many places Moldovan zealots fired or demoted citizens who did not speak the 
language.5  
 
The political confrontations on linguistic issues were accompanied by conflicts 
over Moldova’s status. The Moldovan Popular Front rode a call for national 
independence to overwhelming victory in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Once 
independence was declared, however, the Popular Front called for reunification 
with Romania. This caused unrest in the industrial centers of Transdniestria. 
Transdniestria had never been part of Romania until 1941–1944 when Romania 
(allied with Nazi Germany) controlled this territory. The cruel realities of the 
wartime occupation did not engender a positive image of Romania in the eyes of 
the Transdniestrian population. 6 
 
Shortly after the Language Act, the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK) 
was formed in Tiraspol. The OSTK’s stated goal was to combat Romanian 
nationalism in Moldova. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, the OSTK won most 
of the seats from the Transdniestria region, while the Moldovan Popular Front 
won an overwhelming majority of the seats from the rest of the country. The 
delegates from Transdniestria soon left Chisinau, however, citing threats and 
violence by Popular Front supporters. Two weeks after the Gagauzian 
declaration of autonomy on August 19, 1990, Transdniestrians created their own 
republic (September 2, 1990). Almost immediately, there were violent encounters 
                                                        
4Bender is located on the western side of the Dniestr. Because it is directly across the Dniestr from Tiraspol 
and is essentially Tiraspol’s “sister city,” it was occupied by the DMR. It is the only city in western Moldova 
occupied by the DMR.  
5Later, in 1993, there would be similar persecution in the DMR. Teachers and officials opposed to the 
continued use of Cyrillic were demoted or fired. 
6The population of the rest of Moldova turned out to be no more enthusiastic. In a referendum in March 
1994, 95% of the population voted to remain independent. The Popular Front, by ignoring overwhelming 
public opposition to reunification went from a position of dominance in Moldovan politics to one of 
irrelevance. By then, however, relations between DMR leaders and the government of the Republic were 
beyond repair.    
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between separatists and government forces. Since, this conflict was taking place 
in an area still under Soviet authority, there was no out-and-out warfare between 
the factions.  
 
That changed in August 1991. Following the failed coup in Moscow (a coup 
supported by some DMR leaders), Chisinau declared Moldovan independence. 
In September, agents from Chisinau kidnapped Igor Smirnov, the OSTK’s leader, 
from the Ukraine. After a separatist blockade of the railway running from 
Moldova to the Ukraine (through Transdniestria) caused economic  disruption in 
Moldova, Smirnov was released. In December, shortly after his release, Smirnov 
was elected president of the DMR with 65% of the vote. By spring of 1992, armed 
clashes between Republican and DMR forces were commonplace.  
 
From the beginning of the conflict, Transdniestrian separatists used violence 
against their opponents. Armed “guardians” inspected villages opposed to 
separatism and intimidated the population. Job dismissals, intimidation, even 
murder of active opponents of separatism, led to an exodus to the western side of 
the Dniester (about 25 thousand persons before the outbreak of open warfare).7 
As a result, the Republic of Moldova lost its grip on the eastern region and open 
opponents of separatism within the DMR became increasingly isolated, and 
therefore guarded in their actions and utterances.  
                                                        
7 On December 8, 1991, general elections were held in Moldova. The mayor of the village of Caragas on the 
eastern side of the Dniestr, organized an event for a presidential candidate. Later, he was found dead in a 
well. 
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Russian Involvement in Moldova 
 
Russian Federation experts categorically deny that Russia has supported 
separatism and claim that Russia has involved herself in this conflict because it 
was necessary and no other country would.  However, the content of the first 
document signed by the Russian Federation as peacekeeper in Transdniestria 
supports allegations of interventionism. That document was signed in Moscow 
on July 21, 1992 by the presidents of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian 
Federation. The document created a security zone administered by a Unified 
Control Commission (UCC), which included members from the Republic of 
Moldova, the Russian Federation and the DMR. The agreement allowed 
separatist leaders to maintain the full control over the eastern region of the 
Republic of Moldova and to be protected by peacekeeping forces of the Russian 
Federation. 8 Understandably, this protection has made the leadership of the 
DMR less willing to compromise than it would be without such protection. The 
creation of the state structures of Transdniestria continued under the cover of the 
14th Army and with political, military, economic and informational support from 
the Russian Federation. Formally, this process ended with the adoption through 
referendum of the constitution of the DMR on December 24, 1995.  
 
The Russian mass media has strongly endorsed the positions of the separatists in 
Transdniestria. As a result, the Russian public has come to view the Republic of 
Moldova as an aggressor and Transdniestria as a defender of the Russophone 
population’s rights.  
 
There is clearly a pro-DMR lobby in the State Duma of the Russian Federation. 
The Duma has not yet ratified the treaties between Moldova and Russia signed 
by both parties in 1990 and 1993. The Duma has repeatedly taken provocative 
stances regarding Transdniestria. There have been proposals for bilateral treaties 
between Russia and the DMR. The DMR has been visited many times by Duma 
deputies. The Duma has created a “Commission for Contribution to Settlement 
of Political and Economic Situation in Transdniestria.” Every time elections take 
place in Transdniestria (illegal from the point of view of the Republic of 
Moldova) Russian deputies assist as “international observers” and declare them 
“free and democratic” despite the protests from the Republic of Moldova. The 
Russian Federation insists that representatives of the DMR participate in the 
negotiation of the treaty on friendship and collaboration between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Moldova.  
 
                                                        
8 On July 2, 1992, forces of the Republic of Moldova attempted to recapture Bender. The offensive was called 
off when Russian tanks stationed in Tiraspol moved into Bender.  
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The stability of the DMR stems largely from the fact that the regime serves 
Russian interests. The education system in Transdniestria is based on Russian 
standards. Transdniestrian children study from Russian books. Studies at the 
State University in Tiraspol are based on Russian standards and the University of 
Tiraspol is part of the Russian Association of Universities. The Russian Orthodox 
Church is also actively supporting the separatist regime.  
All the leaders of the DMR are citizens of the Russian Federation and travel to 
different states with Russian foreign passports. Moscow sends these leaders on 
missions. Some of them were included on the election lists of the liberals of 
Zhirinovski and of the “Stalinist Block for the USSR” at the last elections in the 
Duma of the Russian Federation. Tiraspol encourages inhabitants of 
Transdniestria to adopt Russian citizenship. About 65,000 persons have already 
become citizens of the Russian Federation. We can suppose that this push to 
increase the proportion of Russian citizens in Transdniestri a is aimed at 
providing a pretext for future Russian interference in the internal affairs of 
Moldova.  
 
There is a consular section of the Russian Embassy in Tiraspol. Though the 
Russian Federation does not officially recognize the DMR, the presence of this 
consular section lends the regime credibility. On November 2, 2000, the consular 
section signed an agreement with the Edinstvo (Unity) movement regarding the 
procedure to obtain citizenship and foreign passports. The pro-Russian Edinstvo 
movement came to prominence after the implosion of the Popular Front. The 
evolution of Edinstvo and its support from the Russian Federation suggest that 
this may be an attempt to implement a “Costunica” scenario, with a controversial 
leader (Smirnov) replaced by more attractive leaders (Edinstvo). The Republic of 
Moldova would thus lose one of its major arguments (freeing the DMR’s 
population from dictatorship) for regaining sovereignty over this territory. 
Understandably, Igor Smirnov and his companions had an extremely negative 
reaction to this development because they fear that the Russian Federation could 
stake its future on Edinstvo and they could be shunted aside. 
 
The Russian Federation also supports the DMR by providing orders for its 
products. There is also industrial cooperation. Grad multiple rocket launchers are 
assembled at Transdniestrian plants using parts produced at Russian plants. The 
Itera company, which is affiliated with Gazprom from Russia, has privatized the 
metallurgical plant in Rybnitsa (a city in northern Transdniestria), which 
provides about 60% of the budget of the DMR (This privatization was made in 
the absence of an adequate legal framework, yet Chisinau was silent.). In 
addition, during the last ten years the Russian Federation has delivered natural 
gas to Transdniestria. The DMR’s debts for gas already exceed $500 million, but 
the Russian Federation continues to accept token payments of goods in lieu of 
cash. 
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Perhaps not every action by Russians in Moldova has been sanctioned by 
Moscow. Undoubtedly, there were renegade actions. In 1989–1992 the USSR and 
the Russian Federation experienced the kind of political chaos that makes such 
actions possible. However, many official Russian acts have benefited the 
separatists. Government actions are driven largely by self-interest, and it is 
undeniably in the best interests of the Russian Federation is to transform the 
Republic of Moldova into an unofficial protectorate of the Russian Federation. 
Such an outcome could serve as a lever of influence on the Ukraine and 
Romania. In addition, key decision makers in the Russian Federation still regard 
Transdniestria as the key to Balkans. Some Russian military experts believe that 
the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transdniestria would considerably 
reduce the military potential of Russian bases in the Crimea.  
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Transdniestrian Smuggling and Chisinau 
 
When the Republic of Moldova lost the control over Transdniestria, this 
separatist region became a hub of illegal enterprises. The fact that DMR 
authorities have access to an official Republic of Moldova customs stamp 
facilitates such activities.9 The most important of these is the smuggling of 
excised goods – alcohol, tobacco, and oil. Smugglers take products through the 
section of the frontier that is controlled by the DMR (The DMR  controls the 
entire eastern frontier with the Ukraine.). The smugglers declare that the 
products are going to be transited through Transdniestria. They therefore do not 
pay any customs duties or excise taxes. In fact, many of them never arrive on the 
left side of the Dniester River and another part is distributed in many countries. 
About 60% of the oil products brought on the territory of Moldova is smuggled. 
Transdniestria has also become a center of a criminal international network that 
deals in smuggled cigarettes. This business is monopolized by the Sherif firm 
that is protected by the DMR’s Ministry of State Security. The official import per 
capita of the excised goods, only through the customs that are controlled by the 
Republic of Moldova, is about 20 times greater in Transdniestria than in 
Moldova. In fact, Igor Smirnov has named his son President of the State Customs 
Committee. The annual volume of illegal transactions that were performed only 
through the section of the frontier that is controlled by the Republic of Moldova 
exceeds the sum of $500 million.  
 
Illegal arms sales are another income source for the DMR. For example, it is 
known that seven Grad multiple rocket launchers, which were produced at the 
Pribor plant in Bender, reached Abkhazian separatists in Georgia. Additional 
weapons from the DMR arsenals were shipped to the Middle East as well as 
Central Asia. While current and former Moldovan officials are reluctant to speak 
openly, persistent rumors place these weapons in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  In 
1999, Moldovan police arrested a group of DMR soldiers for illegal sale of arms 
and munitions (plastic explosives and detonators, thermobaric projectile 
launchers and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles). The group was led by Colonel 
Nemkov who is the deputy commander of the local Russian peacekeeping forces.  
Nemkov and his group were apprehended by Moldovan authorities in Bender, a 
city that lies on the dividing line between the DMR and the Republic of Moldova.   
On the same day, Colonel Nemkov’s son, an officer in the DMR Ministry of 
Security, and two military associates, were stopped driving a Moskvitch sedan 
which was towing a trailer. The trailer contained three Igla ground to air rockets 
and military telescopes designed for sniper rifles. While Nemkov was convicted 
in a Chisinau court for trading in illegal weapons, he received a pardon and was 
                                                        
9 Interview with the Honorable John Stewart, US Ambassador to Moldova, Chisinau, 22 May 1997.  
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immediately released. Upon his return to Tiraspol, he was allowed to resume his 
position as deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces.  
 
Armament from the DMR was also sold to Chechnya. In March 2000, Russian 
secret services arrested Igor Smirnov’s son who had $1–200,000, believed to be 
the proceeds of armament sold to Chechens. In Summer 2000, false U.S. bank 
notes, which allegedly were paid by Chechens for armament, circulated in the 
DMR. When Vladimir Putin visited Chisinau in June 2000 he was shown an 
automatic grenade launcher that was produced in Transdniestria and used 
against the Russian Army in Chechnya. The Moldovan Ministry of Interior 
brought two of the grenade launchers to show as part of an exhibit intended to 
demonstrate that Tiraspol factories are producing materials for Chechens to use 
in combat against the Russian Army. The exhibit supported a consistent 
Moldovan theme that Smirnov and his associates are criminals deserving no 
official Russian support.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable data about the volume of arms trafficking. 
And, while there has been extensive media speculation, it is impossible to 
determine the precise routes used by arms traffickers. One possible avenue for 
illegal arms shipments is the Tiraspol military aerodrome.  Many Moldovan 
police officials believe this airfield is used for the illegal air transport of military 
armament.  They suspect that the weapons are transported by railroad from 
Odessa to Iliicevsk. A criminal group composed of former Afghanistan fighters 
controls this port and it is used for transportation of armament by sea. 
 
The free hand given Transdniestrian smugglers stems from the unilateral 
yielding of the Republic of Moldova. On February 7, 1996, authorities from 
Moldova and Tiraspol signed the “Protocol Decision Regarding the Customs 
Services of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria.” The first two articles of 
this document required the disbanding of the customs services that were created 
by the DMR along the Dniester River and the creation of a common customs 
service along the frontier with the Ukraine. Article 3 of this document required 
the Republic Moldova to deliver a customs stamp with the inscription: “The 
Republic of Moldova. Customs Tiraspol” to Transdniestria. In ten days, the DMR 
obtained the customs stamp, but has yet to fulfill the first two conditions. 
Authorities in Moldova have thus given the separatist regime the ability to 
legalize the circulation of smuggled goods and to do business outside Moldova 
as economic agents of the Republic of Moldova. There is no evidence that these 
economic agents pay anything to the budget of Moldova.  
 
Such concessions by the Republic of Moldova allow the separatist regime to 
survive economically, maintain an army of comparable size to the Moldovan 
Army, and operate a repressive state machinery. Chisinau’s passivity towards 
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Transdniestrian separatism might be excused, since, after the military conflict 
stopped, Moldovan popular interest toward this problem rapidly waned. In fact, 
there is even limited support for the separatist regime, cultivated by Russian 
language newspapers in the Republic of Moldova. One such paper, Komersant 
Moldovy, is financed by a state agency in Tiraspol.  
 
Chisinau’s generosity towards Transdniestrian separatism is more troubling. It is 
possible that such generosity by politicians in Chisinau toward the DMR is the 
fruit of payments to politicians or political campaigns by separatists or criminals.  
 
The DMR has had friends in high places in Chisinau, particularly politicians who 
came into politics from pro-Moscow political parties. For example, Vladimir 
Solonari was elected to Parliament in 1990 from Edinstvo, which was defending 
the idea of saving the USSR. Immediately after the disintegration of the USSR, 
Solonari, who was a deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 
became active in the structures of DMR and contributed to the consolidation of 
the Transdniestrian state system. He then came back to Chisinau to serve as a 
deputy from 1994 to 1998. The case of Serghei Gradinari is another example. 
Gradinari was a deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova from 1994 
to 1998. Immediately after that, Smirnov appointed him Minister of Finance in 
the DMR government. This position could be a payoff for his support of 
Transdniestrian interests in previous years. 
 2001 15
 
Repression in the DMR 
 
Much of the DMR’s stability can be attributed to the regime’s repression of the 
Transdniestrian population. The DMR’s constitution proclaimed that the DMR 
was “a democratic, sovereign, independent, legal state.” The document contains 
no reference to the Republic of Moldova and prohibits (Article 8) activity aimed 
against the sovereignty of the Republic. This provision has allowed leaders from 
Tiraspol to take repressive measures against opponents of separatism. The 
Ministry of State Security persecutes attempts by Transdniestrian residents to 
participate in the politics of the Republic of Moldova.10 The Helsinki Committee 
for the Human Rights of the Republic of Moldova revealed that officials from the 
Ministry of State Security in Tiraspol have arrested the citizens from western 
Moldova for engaging in political activity in Transdniestria. The same ministry 
hinders every attempt to organize international human rights organizations.  
 
On September 30, 1994, Igor Smirnov issued Decree No. 222 regarding 
“protection of the population from gangsterism and from other manifestations of 
the organized crime.” According to this decree, every suspicious person can be 
held in preventive detention for 30 days. Independent lawyers, such as Chisinau 
attorney Vyatcheslav Turcanu, have access to data on torture at the detention 
centers and have spoken freely about conditions in DMR facilities. In 
Transdniestria, the citizens do not have the right to defend their rights in court 
because the judiciary is state-controlled in the Soviet style.  
 
The Ministry of State Security has become an instrument of election fraud. For 
example, V. Osadciuk, the president of the Tiraspol Election Commission, a body 
which, in December, 2000,  was created for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the 
DMR, is a colonel from this ministry. His initial appointment and his subsequent 
behavior have demonstrated the crucial role of the DMR police in securing 
predictable election results. Even before creation of the Election Commission, the 
police presence at elections was significant and the role of the police in 
“electioneering” was remarkable even by post-Soviet standards. Not only did the 
Ministry count the ballots, it also helped get out the vote on election day.  
 
Though inhabitants of Transdniestria have access to Moldovan broadcasts and 
publications, the DMR’s print and broadcast media is strictly censored. The 
population is regularly intimidated with the “danger of unification with 
Romania.” The Republic of Moldova is portrayed as an aggressor in 1992 and as 
                                                        
10 In 1994, DMR authorities formally forbade voting in the Moldovan parliamentary elections. In the 1998 
elections, there was no formal stricture, but voting was aggressively discouraged, and only about 3,000 
Transdniestrians voted. 
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a possible aggressor in the future. This biased media has fanned the fires of 
separatism.  
 
Relations with the Ukraine and Romania 
 
Separatist leaders have cultivated relations with the Ukraine. Because the 
Ukraine shares a border with the DMR, the Republic of Moldova cannot organize 
an economic blockade of separatist region without the Ukraine’s cooperation. In 
addition, the DMR benefits from a tremendous volume of smuggled goods 
passing through this frontier to and from the seaports of Odessa (to the 
detriment of the economies of the Ukraine and Moldova). Frontier guards are 
generally corrupt and consequently the frontier between the Ukraine and the 
DMR is porous. Finally, the Ukraine is important as a fallback ally in case Russia 
ever loses interest in Transdniestria.  
 
About a quarter of the population of the DMR is of Ukrainian extraction. 
Vladimir Bodnar, a separatist leader from Tiraspol, is also president of the 
Association of Ukrainians from Transdniestria. He frequently meets with 
Ukrainian leaders including the President Leonid Kuchma. During a discussion 
with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, Mr. 
Kuchma declared that the Ukraine would not support any economic blockade of 
the separatist region because it is populated by so many Ukrainians. Tiraspol has 
signed bilateral agreements of cooperation with the administrations of Odessa 
and Vinitsa in the Ukraine. These agreements could not have been concluded 
without the blessing of Kiev. The Ukraine is encouraging the expansion in of 
Ukrainian language education in the DMR by providing teaching materials and 
offering scholarships to Ukrainian universities for graduates of Transdniestrian 
schools. Following the example of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine 
encourages Transdniestrians to obtain Ukrainian citizenship. However,  at 
present, the number of Ukrainian citizens in the DMR is only 2–3,000. Perhaps 
this is being done with an eye toward claiming historical Ukrainian rights over 
Transdniestria if the Republic of Moldova is forced to officially concede the loss 
of Transdniestria. 
According to provisions of a memorandum regarding regulation of the 
Transdniestrian conflict signed on May 8, 1997 in Moscow, the Ukraine, as well 
as Russia, has the status of “state-guarantor.” In mid-1998 Ukrainian forces 
joined Russian, Moldovan and Transdniestrian troops in the security zone.  
 
There are no official relations between Tiraspol and Bucharest. The separatist 
regime continues to pursue an anti-Romanian campaign. The campaign has two 
basic themes, one based on history and another based on recent events. The 
historical theme draws on the experiences of Moldova in the inter-war years 
when “Greater Romania” included most of what is now the Moldovan Republic 
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and during World War Two itself. During these years, DMR officials maintain, 
Romanian police conducted a campaign of repression against Moldovan 
residents on the West bank of the Dniester River and also made routine 
incursions onto the Eastern bank in what was at that time part of the Soviet 
Union. It was only through the intervention of the Russians, they insist, that the 
people of this region were spared the brutality of virtual occupation by the 
Nazis.  
 
Recent events, according to DMR authorities, have witnessed a Romanian return 
to the practices of the 1940s. As evidence, they cite alleged Romanian military 
support for the Moldovan forces during the 1992 war. In particular, they charge, 
Romanian pilots played an active combat role. Their military service was 
augmented by a steady flow Romanian military hardware across the Prut River 
into Chisinau.  DMR spokesmen charge that Romanian military “adventurism” is 
now being replaced by a strident form of “Romanian nationalism” that aims at 
the “destruction” of the non-Romanian communities on the eastern bank of the 
Dniester.  
 
Relations between Transdniestria and Romania are limited to the exchange of 
goods by private economic agents. This traffic is rather limited and there are few 
Romanian commercial goods on sale in Tiraspol and the surrounding 
communities. More significant in economic terms is the fact that Transdniestria 
imports oil from Romania. As a producer of petroleum products, Romania is one 
of the few regional suppliers for essential energy resources. The uncertainty of 
the DMR economy and the attendant difficulties in assuring prompt payment, 
however, inhibit the expansion of this trade.  The Rybnitsa Metallurgical Plant is 
also involved in trading with Romania since a major part of the metal it produces 
starts out as scrap metal from Romania.  
 
In the spring of 1992 four countries – Russia, Romania, the Ukraine and Moldova 
– were involved in attempt to settle the Transdniestrian conflict, which, by then, 
had claimed about a thousand lives. Representatives met in Chisinau, 6–17 April 
1992. Romania, which was represented by Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, was 
the only country that supported Moldova in accordance with international law. 
Unfortunately, a major battle broke out in Bender on June 18, 1992, causing the 
failure of the initiative. There is suspicion in Moldova that Russian secret 
services, wishing to eliminate Romania from the settlement of the Transdniestria 
conflict, were behind the outbreak. Certainly, the incident worked to Russia’s 
advantage. Since then, though the OSCE has become involved in negotiations, 
Russia has been in the driver’s seat with regard to mediating the conflict.  
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Relations with Gagauzia  
 
In the interests of keeping Moldova within the Russian orbit, Moscow has aided 
separatists not only in Transdniestria but in Gagauzia as well. On September 26, 
1990 elections in the Supreme Soviet of the so-called “Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Gagauz Republic within the USSR” were planned to take place. Mircea 
Druc, prime minister of Moldova, tried to stop those elections by force and sent 
several thousand “volunteers” to Gagauzia. That action intensified the 
opposition of Gagauz people towards Chisinau. In 1994, the Parliament of the 
Republic of Moldova granted autonomy to Gagauzia, but that has not solved the 
problem. Radical leaders from Gagauzia continued to accuse the authorities from 
Chisinau of aggravating the social-economic situation.  
 
Relations between Tiraspol and Comrat (the capital of Gagauzia) have been 
friendly. In 1990, while Mircea Druc’s “volunteers” attempted to stop the Gagauz 
elections, the Unified Council of Work Staffs from the DMR sent dozens of buses 
full of armed “guardians” to support the Gagauz separatists. 11 Tiraspol has also 
offered Gagauzia electricity produced by the thermal-electric station in 
Cuciurgan. Significantly, even during such times of economic austerity in the 
DMR, Tiraspol’s officials arranged to sell the electricity to Gagauzia at a price 
well below the market value. In 1999, elections for the Popular Assembly (a 
legislative body with 35 deputies) took place in Gagauzia. The extremist wing 
led by Mihail Kendighelean was the big electoral winner. On July 5, 2000 in 
Tiraspol, Grigore Marakutsa, president of Supreme Soviet of the DMR, received 
the delegation of Popular Assembly of Gagauzia. The delegation was led by 
Michael Kendiglian , one of Comrat’s most hardline officials. As part of that visit, 
an agreement of collaboration was signed. In that agreement, Gagauzia 
recognized the legality of DMR. This document states that the coordination of 
efforts between Tiraspol and Comrat are aimed at creating a common front for 
weakening the central authority of Chisinau. Since then, the Popular Assembly of 
Gagauzia has frequently demanded that Gagauzia should be involved in 
negotiations regarding the organization of a common state. 12 
 
Relations  with Moldova 
 
The DMR’s official position toward the Republic of Moldova is uncompromising 
–the DMR and the Republic of Moldova are two sovereign states with equal 
rights that, in accordance with the Memorandum of May 8, 1997, could create a 
common state. Unification is clearly not Tiraspol’s preference, however. On July 
13, 2000 at Chisinau, Igor Smirnov was supposed to sign the “Agreement 
                                                        
11The USSR also sent troops. It was the arrival of troops from the Interior Ministry that caused the armed 
“volunteers” to return to Chisinau. This intervention is a major reason for Gagauzian warmth toward Russia. 
12 July 2,2000 in Tiraspol, Gagauz Yeri opened a “consular office” headed by Ivan Burgudji.  
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Regarding Application of Popular Diplomacy in Order to Reestablish Faith 
Between the Population from Both Sides of Dniester River.” After previously 
promising to sign this document, Smirnov has now categorically refused to sign 
it. 
 
Before the 2001 elections in which the Communists regained political power in 
Moldova, the Moldovan Communist Party developed closer ties with their 
ideological allies in Tiraspol. Communists from Transdniestria participated at 
Communist meetings in Chisinau and routinely maintained close contacts with 
Party officials there. Yet, as long as Petru Lucinschi was President of Moldova, 
those developments had no impact on relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
Relations between Communists in Chisinau and those in Comrat have also been 
friendly. On the eve of anticipated elections for the Parliament of the Republic of 
Moldova, Communist leader Vladimir Voronin signed an agreement with 25 
deputies from the Popular Assembly of Gagauzia. The deputies pledged 
Gagauzian support for the Communist Party and Voronin promised to consider 
the possibility of Moldova’s joining the Russia-Belorussia union. They also 
promised that they would proclaim Russian as the official language of 
Moldova.13  
 
However, Communist support for the hard-line faction in Gagauzia, at least in 
the past, has not translated into electoral success. This was illustrated by the 1999 
election for chief executive (Bashkan) of Gagauzia, in which Dumitru Croitor, 
easily won election in spite of being opposed by the Communist Party. Croitor is 
not as radical in his actions and declarations as Kendighelean, but his stance 
toward Chisinau is not very different.  
 
Communists in the Republic of Moldova fared better than their comrades in 
Gagauzia. As a result of the parliamentary elections of February 25, 2001, the 
Communists won and Voronin became president. 14 This has raised fears that the 
Republic of Moldova may reunite with the DMR as a Communist state. 
                                                        
13Most Gagauzians speak Russian. 
14The Republic of Moldova has a modified proportional representation system. It is designed to weigh in 
favor of major parties to avoid the kind of multi-party chaos that is often present in pure proportional 
representation systems. As a result, though the Communists only received 50.2% of the popular vote, they 
received 70.3% of the parliamentary seats. 
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NEW LEADERSHIP AND OLD ISSUES 
 
Reasons for the Communist Victory 
 
The victory of the Moldovan Communist Party (CP) during the parliamentary 
elections on February 25, 2001 had a dramatic impact on the Moldovan Republic 
and the stability of the DMR. This was the most attention focused on this region 
since the armed conflicts of 1992. The fact that the communist return to power 
came within the context of the democratization of the RM gave analysts great 
cause for concern.  
 
While the victory of the communists may have come as a surprise to casual 
Western observers, local analysts had long predicted victory for Voronin’s party. 
The dimensions of that victory, however, were a surprise even to the communists 
themselves. Under Moldovan electoral law, the popular results gave them 71 out 
of 101 seats in the new Parliament.  
 
The success of the communists may be attributed to several causes. The first and 
most obvious reason was expressed by the CP leader Vladimir Voronin in the 
immediate post-electoral period. At that time he stated that “the result of the 
elections represents not only the victory of the CP”, but an overwhelming 
rejection of the current government and its policies.  
 
After Moldova declared its independence in 1991, the RM gained Western 
support as a result of its important geopolitical position. Consequently, Moldova 
began its reforms with significant Western encouragement and was soon 
recognized as a leader in the post-Soviet reform process.  The small nation was 
routinely cited by Western authorities as being a leader of the reform process in 
the former USSR. Meanwhile, the notion of “reform” was accepted by the local 
population as the proper solution for Moldova’s problems. Unfortunately, the 
process of transforming the economy into a market system didn’t bring benefits 
for most people. In fact, the standard of living for the average citizen declined 
during this period. A poor economic environment was coupled with political 
instability, endless and bitter power struggles, and instability in the political 
leadership.   
 
A second  important factor in the communist victory was the astute political 
agenda established for the electoral campaign: the liberalization of prices, the 
reestablishment of order, social guarantees, participation in the Russian-
Belarusian Union, and having Russian as the second official state language. All 
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of these nostalgic promises were addressed to people who felt neglected during 
the ten post-communist years: the rural population, Russian speakers who 
resented demands that they should learn Romanian and workers who suffered 
from non-payment of wages. 
 
A third reason for the communist victory was the ineffectiveness of other 
electoral competitors. The center-right political parties seemed concerned 
primarily with their internal relationships and failed to establish a favorable 
popular image in contrast to that of the communists. Had the center-right parties 
established a unified front, they would have won approximately the same 
number of votes as the communists. Throughout most of the year prior to the 
elections, the center-right leaders focused their greatest hostility on each other 
rather than on their communist rivals.  
 
Being unable to establish their own credibility as a governing force, the 
representatives of the center-right parties simply maintained that the communist 
party wasn’t ready to govern. The communists, they insisted, would fail just as 
and the Moldovan Agrarian Democratic party failed when in controlled the 
government. Petru Bogatu, writing in an editorial in Tara, predicted that a 
communist victory would bring two results:  
 
1) The Moldovan situation would become even worse than before and the 
government would once again lose popular confidence.  
2) Moldova’s fledgling democratic system, built over the last decade, would 
collapse and take the economy down with it. 15 
 
Reactions to the Communist Victory 
 
The Romanian political elite, now under the leadership of former communist Ion 
Illiescu, was alarmed by the success of the Moldovan communists. One of 
Romania’s leading journals declared that “Moldova has tragically and needlessly 
surrendered in front of the red tide”. Yet, as it made this statement, the editorial 
suggested that Romania shares  responsibility for this development because it 
failed to establish solid relations with its neighbor across the Prut.16 
 
The Russian reaction, if one looks beyond official statements, reflects an element 
of ambivalence. While the Russian mass media was often effusive in its reactions 
to the elections, many analysts in Moscow, speaking unofficially, expressed both 
realism and reservations. Some expressed their concern that Moldova, if drawn 
considerably closer to the Russian Federation, might constitute a burden to the 
                                                        
15 Tara, 19 January 2001 
16 Evenimentul Zilei, 27 February 2001 
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already burdened Russian-Belarusian Union. Moldova, they observe, is the 
poorest country in Europe and the development of its national economy has been 
very slow, even by CIS standards. Moreover, such analysts maintain, Moscow’s 
relationship with the United States may well be further complicated should the 
impression emerge that Russia is attempting to assimilate Moldova. 17 
 
The official reaction of the DMR concerning the election results was rather 
cautious. In his first statement, DMR President Igor Smirnov insisted that “the 
leadership of DMR is waiting to see if Voronin’s electoral promises are translated 
into reality.” 18 
 
Independent observers in Tiraspol noted that the communist victory was not, in 
fact, welcomed by Tiraspol’s leaders because they felt embarrassed by the 
dramatic power shift in Chisinau after so many years of denouncing Moldova as 
the main threat to its security. Even more important was their suspicion that 
Moscow would clearly prefer Voronin to Smirnov in any Moldovan 
confrontation. Tiraspol’s role as a “bridgehead of Russian interests” in Moldova 
was shattered and the value —in Moscow— of the Tiraspol leadership was 
seriously degraded.  According to unofficial observers, Tiraspol’s leadership fell 
into a state of panic in the aftermath of the February elections.  
 
The new environment prompted Smirnov to take what might be regarded as 
emergency actions to respond to this new “threat” to the DMR’s stability. Non-
governmental organizations in Transdniestria, which, for the most part, are 
manipulated  by the government, were quickly mobilized to counter any popular 
ambivalence about Tiraspol’s relations with Chisinau. All NGO leaders 
suspected of weakness in the face of the new challenge were removed. Their 
replacements came from the ranks of the most hardline among the DMR 
leadership. Meanwhile, security forces were called upon to be even more vigilant 
and increasingly alert to any threats posed based in the Moldovan Republic.  19 
 
In April, the Moldovan Parliament finally approved a new government headed 
by Vasile Tarlev with Vladimir Voronin as President. The ceremony of 
investiture took place at a session of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. 
Deputies and members of the Constitutional Court, ambassadors accredited in 
Chisinau, members of Government, hierarchical representatives of the Orthodox 
Church, representatives of the local Parliament in Gagauzia led by Mihai 
Kendighelean, participated in the ceremony. Significantly, representatives of the 
DMR Supreme Soviet didn’t attend the ceremony, even though Grigorii 
                                                        
17 Interviews conducted the Moscow staff of the William R. Nelson Institute, March, 2001 
18 Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 28 February 2001 
19 Interview with Serghei Kirlak, Chisinau, 13 March 2001 
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Maracuta (the president of the DMR Supreme Soviet) initially indicated that he 
planned to attend. 
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Impact on the Stability of the DMR 
 
The new Moldovan leadership declared during the political campaign that one of 
the main priorities of a communist administration would be the solution of the 
Transdniestrian conflict. After the elections, William Hill, the OSCE 
representative in Moldova, stated that should Chisinau and Tiraspol adopt 
constructive positions, negotiations concerning the Transdniestrian conflict could 
be successfully completed by determining the juridical status of the region. 
“There is no reason, at least not a reasonable one, for delaying negotiations. The 
existing obstacles have been only artificial ones”. President Voronin has opposed 
what he refers to as “excessive internationalization “ of the Transdniestrian 
problem and against negotiations in Bratislava or Vienna. It is the “parties  who 
are in conflict who should find a solution”, not foreign diplomats. 20 
 
The communist electoral success alarmed those elements of the DMR leadership 
who fear that their stability is undermined by the type of negotiations suggested 
above. Even more detrimental to the DMR’s stability is Voronin’s support for 
Moldovan membership in the Russian Belarus union. Obviously, the Russian 
Federation would oppose a separatist regime in Moldova and the utility of the 
DMR government would vanish.  “Olvia-press” in Tiraspol immediately 
broadcast an interview with Valeriu Litkai, “the grey eminence” of the DMR who 
heads the DMR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Litkai, Tiraspol will not 
allow its relationship with Chisinau to be determined exclusively by the prospect 
of Moldovan membership in the Russian-Belarus Union.21 
 
Following Voronin’s assumption of the presidency there were three events that 
demonstrated that Voronin’s election would quickly determine the fate of the 
DRM. The first was on 9 April 2001, when Vladimir Voronin, in one of his first 
acts as president, met with DMR President Igor Smirnov. On 16-17 April, 
Voronin visited the Russian Federation where he discussed, among other things, 
relations with the DMR. On  18-19 April, Moldova has been already visited by 
Evghenii Primakov, the Head of the State Comission of the Russian Federation, 
visited Moldova in order to “discuss and clarify” the Transnistrean situation.  
 
The most significant of these events was the meeting on 9 April, which was 
initiated by President Voronin who viewed the meeting as a means of 
stimulating the negotiation process. Voronin and Smirnov were joined by several 
key officials: Vasile Sturza, the president of the State Committee for Solving the 
Transdniestrian conflict within the Government in Chisinau, William Hill, the 
OSCE representative in Moldova, Petro Cialii, the Ukrainian Ambassador to 
Moldova, and Aleksandr Novojilo, the representative of the Russian Presidency 
                                                        
20 Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 12 March 2001 
21 Olvia Press (Tiraspol), 5 March 2001 
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in the process of negotiation between Chisinau and Tiraspol. As the meeting 
began, Vasile Sturza, stressing a positive and optimistic attitude in Chisinau, 
declared Moldovan support for creating a new strategy for solving the 
Transnistrean conflict within the context of broader international participation in 
the forthcoming Bratislava meetings. Sturza’s optimism was not immediately 
rewarded and Igor Smirnov continued to display what most observers regarded 
as an inflexible attitude. 22 
 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chisinau-Tiraspol dialogue continued to be 
based on certain fundamental assumptions. First, the Moldovan Republic and the 
DMR represent two single subjects, equal in rights, and who maintain their 
sovereignty and legitimacy. The words “harmonization of customs and fiscal 
legislation…”, noted in the concluding documents, acknowledge this position. 
Second, DMR authorities enjoy the same legitimacy as Moldovan officials. 
Voronin, by signing the conference document, committed Moldova to cancel the 
“customs and fiscal prohibitions of Moldova at the border of Transdniestria”, 
thus acknowledging Smirnov’s authority over “the state frontier” while making 
no reference to the border with the Ukraine. The word “conflict” does not appear 
in the document.  23 
 
Vladimir Voronin’s visit the Russian Federation followed within only a few days.  
In fact, it came even before the Moldovan Parliament had selected the leaders of 
the new government. Yet, the results of the meetings are significant for the 
stability of the DMR. Voronin participated in a series of meetings with officials 
from the Russian Federation, including the leadership of “Gazprom”. The latter 
meeting was especially significant in securing basic Moldovan energy needs but 
also represented the willingness of the Russian leadership to alleviate one of the 
key vulnerability of the Moldovan Republic. In taking such a step, Russia clearly 
identifies  itself with Chisinau after many years of maintaining a more reserved 
position.  
 
Official Russian skepticism about Transdniestrian claims of “legality” were 
underlined by Evghenii Primakov during his two days in Chisinau. Sources on 
the Moldovan governmental commission for solving the Transdniestrian 
problem indicate that Primakov came to Chisinau to meet specialist groups from 
Chisinau and Tiraspol and to discuss with them a new project for determining 
the status of Transdniestria. The new project was developed by the Ukraine, 
Russia and the OSCE, with participation of Chisinau and Tiraspol. The project is 
generally referred to as the  “Primakov project” and, in its initial form, called for 
the federalization of Moldova, a condition long rejected by Moldovan authorities. 
During his visit, Primakov also stated that the problem of evacuation the Russian 
                                                        
22 Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 10 April 2001 
23 Ibid. 
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Federation's troops from Moldova's territory was not a Russian priority. Such a 
position represents a rejection of a long-held Moldovan demand for a 
withdrawa l of these forces. 
 
On April 19, Primakov visited Tiraspol. His time in the DMR began with a 
private meeting with Igor Smirnov, followed by a briefing for journalists and 
meeting with the "deputies of the legislative Committee" of DMR. Within the 
framework  of these meetings, Primakov announced the "small steps" policy in 
solving the Transdniestrian problem and he underlined the necessity for all 
parties to renounce extreme solutions. Smirnov, in his concluding remarks to 
journalists, declared that Russian President Vladimir Putin has created "two 
separate committees" for economic collaboration between the Russian Federation 
and Moldova, one for Chisinau and one for Tiraspol. This action, he insisted, 
proves that Russia endorses the notion of two Moldovan states. 24 
 
During these diplomatic exchanges, Voronin took an important action calculated 
to strengthen his position among opposition factions in Moldova while further 
undermining Smirnov’s position.  On 12 April, mass media in Chisinau 
broadcast Vladimir Voronin's letter addressed to Smirnov and asking Igor 
Smirnov to "pardon" Ilie Ilascu and the other members of the so-called Ilascu 
group as a humanitarian gesture during Easter. While the other members of his 
group remained in prison, Ilie Ilascu was set free on 5 May 2001 and transferred 
by Tiraspol's security to special services in Chisinau. Upon arriving in Chisinau, 
Ilascu first asked to meet President Voronin whom he thanked for heaving 
obtained his release. The President affirmed that the meeting with Ilascu took 
place around 11 o'clock and that Ilascu was "in a pretty good mood and 
cheerful".  
 
Romanian President Ion Iliescu reacted enthusiastically to news of Ilascu’s 
release, describing it “as a very important political moment" and the result of a 
political evolution and international pressure. Illiescu described this action as an 
important indication of promise for a political resolution of the Transdniestrian 
conflict, which remains a "delicate problem, a sensitive one "for the Moldovan 
stability for its integration and for the territory.25 Adrian Severin, the president of 
the Parliamentary Administration of the OSCE, echoed President Illiescu by 
agreeing that this act provided hope for a more rational and constructive 
approach of the Transdniestrian crisis.26 
 
On 13 April, the Belarus Ambassador to Moldova, Vasile Socovici, accompanied 
by other officials of the Byelorussian Embassy, visited Tiraspol. Officials in 
                                                        
24 Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 19 April 2001  
25 Radio Romania Actualitati, 5 May 2001 
26 Rompress, 6 May 2001 
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Tiraspol used this meeting to consolidate economic relations between the DMR 
and Belarus. They also gave the Ambassador a set of documents purporting to be 
the results of the referendum in Transdniestria on the question of having the 
DMR join the Russia Belarus Union as a separate member. The results, they 
explained to the Ambassador, indicated great enthusiasm on the part of all the 
residents of the DMR. 27 
 
On 1 May 2001, Voronin made an official visit to Romania during which he 
participated in the ecological summit of the Carpathian -Danubian countries, 
which took place in Bucharest. During his stay, Voronin met President Iliescu 
and they called for pragmatism in Romanian-Moldovan relations, underlining 
the necessity of economic cooperation. Among the most important issues 
discussed by the two presidents were: creation of business centers in the capitals 
of both states, construction of railroads with European gauge tracks, sustaining 
Moldovan efforts for adherence to the South Eastern European Stability Pact and 
other international organizations, and greater use of Romanian financial support 
for privatisation of energy, transport, and agricultural companies in Moldova.  
 
The tone of the new Moldovan foreign policy became clear by when Voronin, at 
the invitation of his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kuchma, announced an 
official visit to Kiev. With this recognition of the importance of the Ukraine to the 
Moldovan agenda, Voronin has indicated that relations with Moscow, Bucharest 
and Kiev are Moldova’s first concerns. Byelorussia is also considered important 
and Voronin quickly indicated his intention to visit this nation in the first days of 
his administration.  
 
Summary: Voronin as a Factor on the Stability of the DMR 
 
Vladimir Voronin, in his first actions as President, has indicated the following:  
 
He is willing to accept Igor Smirnov as a legitimate  leader; 
He sees the DMR as a genuine state and is willing to recognize the DMR’s 
sovereignty.  
He is willing to forgo the internationalization of the Transdniestrian dispute and 
will allow the Russian Federation to control resolution of this problem with 
Moldova and thereby guarantee Moldova’s territorial integrity.  
He is apparently willing to accept a Russian military presence in Moldova.  
 
The position of the officials of the Russian Federation can be expressed in the 
following assumptions:  
 
                                                        
27 Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 13 April 2001 
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The Russian Federation, even after the communist success in Moldova, seems 
reluctant to pressure Transdniestrian leaders. The Russian Federation apparently 
has no interest in reestablishment of the territorial integrity of Moldovan 
Republic.  
 
As a means of solving the Transdniestrian conflict, the Russian Federation 
intends to create a “guarantee” mechanism, through which it may direct the 
internal political processes in Moldova and maintain Moldova under its 
unofficial protection. This goal can be achieved by imposing the internal 
organization of a “common state”, thus allowing Russia to control Moldova’s 
behavior. The Primakov Memorandum of May 1997 is a first step toward this 
goal. 
 
In spite of the fears of the DMR leadership, the Russian Federation is likely to 
continue to promote at least some elements of the separatist regime in 
Transdniestria. Should the DMR completely disintegrate, Moscow loses its status 
as “guarantor” of Moldova’s security. Moldovan membership in the Russian-
Belarus Union is not likely to change this.  
 
The Russian Federation’s role in Moldova will be irreversibly legalized should 
the new government facilitate the privatization of key Moldovan industries by 
means of Russian economic agencies, especially those controlled by Russian 
criminal organizations.  Russian “generosity” in supplying the DMR with natural 
gas at no charge for almost a decade indicates how such control may be 
developed. 28 
 
In summary, it is important to recognize that while Voronin’s election to the 
Presidency represents a threat to the DMR’s stability, the new administration is 
not inclined to exploit Tiraspol’s vulnerability. The key item on Voronin’s agenda 
is strengthening the domestic situation of the Moldovan Republic and direct 
confrontations with the DMR will not advance that goal. The greatest threat to 
the DMR, therefore, is posed not by Chisinau’s actions during this time but by 
Tiraspol’s reactions to a perceived threat. The DMR’s refusal to allow Voronin to 
travel to Tiraspol to visit his elderly mother shortly after his assumption of the 
Presidency is an indication that local authorities may well be reverting to the 
attitudes and action of the past decade.  Should Smirnov and his associates begin 
to operate on the basis of a paranoid fear of being undermined by a more 
attractive Moldovan alternative, they will prove themselves to have been their 
own worst enemies. The consequences of such an over-reaction are likely to be 
tragic and raise the real possibility of a return to the violence of the first post-
Soviet years.  
                                                        
28 In the early days of the Voronin administration, Russia has indicated that it will demand cash payments for 
supplying natural gas to Moldova.  
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APPENDIX  
 
The Opposition View: Trading Sovereignty for Illusory Integrity 
 
On May 16, 2001, President Voronin met in Tiraspol with his “counterpart,” 
Igor Smirnov. There was great interest for this event especially as several days 
earlier, on May 12, Vladimir Voronin had been denied entry to DMR territory 
where he wanted to visit the Noul Neamt monastery (in Chitcani, on the right 
Dniester bank, officially in the security zone).  
 
In Tiraspol Vladimir Voronin signed five documents (“Protocols” or 
“Agreemen ts”). They comply with the Joint Declaration of the leaders of the 
Moldovan Republic and DMR signed on April 9th in Chisinau and with the 
Memorandum regarding the normalization of the relations between the 
Republic of Moldova and DMR (Moscow, May 8th 1997). Essentially, these 
documents refer to bilateral documents regulating the relations between two 
subjects of international law after the end of the armed conflict between the 
two states. 
 
The most important of these documents is arguably the “Protocol regarding 
the mutual recognition of the documents issued by DMR and the Republic of 
Moldova.” By signing this document, Voronin has acknowledged the right of 
the separatist regime in Tiraspol to issue the whole range of official documents 
granted by a sovereign state to its citizens. This together with Voronin’s 
commitment to recognize the documents issued and authenticated by notary 
public offices, show that the Moldovan President has abandoned both the 
population in the areas controlled by Igor Smirnov and all the assets of the 
Moldovan state in Transdniestria. It is also apparent that this Protocol 
facilitates the international recognition of the DMR, as Article 2 reads “The 
parties will inform foreign states and international organizations about the 
document s coordinated by the two parties.” The Republic of Moldova will 
grant freedom of commercial activities to all companies from Transdniestria 
outside of Moldova, just like in the case of the customs stamp, which 
Moldovan officials gave to DRM customs officials several years ago. In the 
meantime, the inhabitants of the separatist area, especially those who for over 
ten years have regarded themselves as citizens of the Republic of Moldova, are 
left to the mercy of a hostile regime. 
 
Article 4 regarding foreign investments and cooperation in the investment 
field univocally and explicitly admits the existence of two different territories, 
the Republic of Moldova and DMR (“The parties will address the diplomatic, 
consular and economic representatives on the territories of the Republic of 
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Moldova and of the Dniester Moldovan Republic  asking them to use the 
stipulations of the this Protocol in their activities as citizens and economic 
representatives of their own countries”). This implies that there is already an 
understanding between Vladimir Voronin and Igor Smirnov regarding the 
boundaries between the two territories. It is the same kind of agreement that 
Hitler and Stalin had back in August 1939 when they drew their own frontiers 
on the political map of Europe.  
 
The Protocol concluded after the meeting of the leaders of the Republic of 
Moldova and DMR has an article stipulating that the Government of the 
Republic of Moldova must devise a plan to pay the Moldovan state debts to 
DMR. It is obvious that such a relationship can only exist between two states. 
The most important article in the Protocol regards paying damages to DMR 
for the armed conflict from 1992. The very presence of such an article in a 
documents signed by the Moldovan President is a sign that Vladimir  Voronin 
is on a par with Igor Smirnov when approaching the tragic events of 1992. Igor 
Smirnov, however, never forgets to reiterate that in 1992 the Republic of 
Moldova committed an act of aggression against the “Transdniestrian 
people.” Therefore, all the Moldovan citizens who fought for the territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Moldova, including those who died in the 1992 
events, will be labeled as “aggressors” in the near future.  
 
The documents signed on May 16 in Tiraspol, as well as various events or 
statements related to the Transdniestrian conflict (such as the participation of 
the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Moldova in the meeting of the CIS 
Defense Ministers’ Council in Baku, May 18 2001, for example), allow us to 
make some predictions about the evolution of the events in the near future.  
 
The intensity of the events related to the Transdniestrian problem comes from 
the fact that in November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul the Russian 
Federation made a commitment to withdraw its ammunition and armament 
from the territory of the Republic of Moldova by 2001. Unwilling to carry out 
its promise, the Russian Federation needed a Moldovan leadership that would 
legalize its military presence in Moldova. To this end, the Communist Party 
prevented the election of the President by the former Parliament and had a 
decisive contribution to the dissolution of the Parliament and the early 
elections on February 25. Before the February 2001 elections, a detailed 
scenario regarding the fate of Moldova and Transdniestria was developed; 
this scenario started to be put into practice immediately after Vladimir 
Voronin was inaugurated as President on April 7, 2001. The rough outlines of 
this scenario are as follows: 
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Under the pretext of solving the Transdniestrian conflict, the Republic of 
Moldova will soon become a confederation with two (Chisinau, Tiraspol) or 
even three (if we include Comrat) subjects with equal rights. This 
confederation will be accepted at the earliest possible date as a member of the 
Russia-Belarus Union. Immediately after the meeting on the 16th of May at 
Tiraspol, the Russian Federation Duma has started the preparations to create a 
legal frame and a favorable public opinion in order to achieve this goal. 
 
The agreements reached between Chisinau and Tiraspol will be enforced 
through a mechanism of “warranties” soon to be released. This mechanism 
will confirm Moscow’s mediating role in the Chisinau-Tiraspol relations. 
Russian military presence on the territory of the Moldovan Republic  will be 
one of these “warranties.”. At the same time, the admission of the newly 
formed Confederation in the Russia-Belarus Union will legitimate the 
establishment of Russian military bases in Moldova.  
 
The incident on May 12, when president Vladimir Voronin was denied access 
to the Noul Neamt monastery by the Transdniestrians is part of the same 
scenario. The public was thus led to believe that president Voronin tried to 
intervene but the “evil” Igor Smirnov didn’t let him. Thus the responsibility 
was lifted from Voronin and at the same time the Russians continue the 
process of taking complete control over the Moldovan Patriarchy using 
Justinian.  
 
In the near future the communist MP’s will initiate a procedure to alter the 
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and during that process it will 
became clearer what kind of Confederation Moldova is going to be a part of 
according to this scenario. At the same time both the head of the state and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will do everything to persuade Europe on 
Moldova’s intentions of becoming part of the EU (the Europeans are so naïve 
as to believe the statements of the politicians in the ex-Soviet countries).  
 
Another problem is to ensure that the Republic of Moldova, once a part of the 
Belarus-Russia Union, can no longer leave the Union even if the leadership 
changes. Kremlin has already gone through the painful experience of the 
collapse of the former USSR and understands this is the most difficult 
problem. To solve it, they will modify the core structure of the state bodies of 
the Republic of Moldova (a bicameral Parliament, with a consolidated 
presence of the DMR and Gagauz Yeri MP’s, etc.) Russian capital will be used 
to privatize the strategic areas of the “Confederation’s” “national economy” 
and the investments will be directed toward DMR industry, to make sure that 
the living standards of the population on the left bank of the Dniester are 
higher than those of the population on the right bank. Moldovan citizens and 
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especially DMR citizens will be even more persistently encouraged to adopt 
Russian citizenship. The formal end of hostilities will naturally allow the 
Russian Federation to open consulates in DMR. At the same time, since they 
are components of the “common state,” DMR and Gagauz Yeri will have a 
high degree of independence that will allow Russia to formally recognize 
them as independent states in case the situation on the right bank of the 
Dniester goes out of control. 
 
It’s obvious that this scenario is not the only possible one. Of particular 
interest is Igor Smirnov’s situation. Some analysts think that Vladimir 
Voronin, by making bigger concessions (compromises) than his predecessors, 
is trying to catch Voronin off-guard at the presidential elections that will take 
place in DMR in December 2001. Then, they hope, Moscow will dispose of the 
much-hated Smirnov and will support another person who will not be so 
tainted by his relations with the criminal underworld. However, since 
everybody – including OSCE and the Moldovan leadership – accepts Smirnov 
as the legitimate representative of DMR interests, when Igor Smirnov is the 
most consistent proponent of Moscow’s interests, it is very unlikely that the 
Russian Federation will do so.  
 
Another issue of interest is the Communist Party’s stance as to the DMR 
problem and Voronin’s actions. It is obvious that lower-rank communists in 
the Parliament are not aware of the current issues related to DMR and the 
future of the Moldovan state. Time will probably give us an answer to this 
question. Voronin is not likely to have problems with his own party, since he 
is the most authoritative figure inside the Communist Party and, above all, the 
communists believe that the collapse of the USSR was a crime and any 
activities related to the restoration of the former USSR is noble and justified.  
 
 
